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Abstract: 
On Saturday February 7, 2009, 173 people lost their lives and more than 2000 houses were 
destroyed in bushfires (wildfires) in the Australian state of Victoria. The scale of life and 
property loss raised fundamental questions about community bushfire safety in Australia, in 
particular the appropriateness of the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy. This 
paper presents findings from research undertaken as part of the Australian Bushfire 
Cooperative Research Centre’s (CRC) ‘2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Taskforce’. The 
research examined factors influencing patterns of life and property loss/survival across the 
fires through mail surveys (n=1314) of fire affected households. Just over half of the 
respondents (53%) stayed to defend their homes and properties, while the remainder left 
before or when the fires arrived (43%) or sheltered in a house, structure, vehicle, or outside 
(4%). Results reveal a survival rate of 77% for houses that were defended by one or more 
household members, compared to 44% for unattended houses. The paper identifies inadequate 
planning and preparedness and the tendency for people to wait until they are directly 
threatened before taking action as major factors leading to late evacuation, failed defence, and 
passive shelter. 
 
Brief summary: 
This paper examines household preparedness and responses to the 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ 
bushfires in Victoria, Australia. Results from a mail survey indicate that while leaving early is 
the safest response to bushfires, staying to defend can be a viable alternative to evacuation for 
some people.  
 
Keywords: bushfire; wildfire; evacuation; emergency response; community safety. 
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1. Introduction  1 
On Saturday February 7 2009, 173 people lost their lives and more than 2000 homes were 2 
destroyed in bushfires in the Australian state of Victoria. Fires burned under the most severe 3 
fire weather conditions on record in Victoria, with a record high maximum temperature of 4 
46.4°C (115.5ºF) in Melbourne, record low relative humidity, and strong winds throughout 5 
the state (Karoly 2009). These conditions were accurately forecast, and Victorians had been 6 
warned to prepare for ‘the worst [fire danger] day in the history of the state’ (Premier of 7 
Victoria, John Brumby, cited in Moncrief, 2009). The day saw more than 400 fires across 8 
Victoria, with most of the major fires started by fallen powerlines or arson (Teague et al., 9 
2010). Fires quickly burned out of control as communities came under threat with little or no 10 
official warning. The speed, intensity and extent of the fires meant that firefighting capacities 11 
were stretched and, in line with official advice for all bushfires, most residents responded 12 
without direct assistance from fire services. 13 
14 
 4 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
Fire Cause Fatalities Houses destroyed Area burnt 
Kilmore East Electrical failure 119 1,242 125,383 
Murrindindi Undetermined 40 538 168,542 
Churchill Suspected arson 11 145 25,861 
Beechworth-
Mudgegonga  
Electrical failure 2 38 33,577 
Bendigo Suspected arson 1 58 341 
Redesdale Undetermined 0 14 7,086 
Horsham Electrical failure 0 13 2,346 
 19 
Figure 1: The 2009 Victorian bushfires (January – February) 20 
 21 
Under the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ (PSDLE) policy, Australian fire services 22 
had advised residents to prepare to stay and defend their homes and properties against 23 
bushfire, or to prepare and leave well before a fire arrived in their area (AFAC, 2005a). This 24 
advice was based on evidence that residents can protect houses from bushfires, provided they 25 
are prepared to do so, and that a large number of deaths have occurred during late 26 
 5 
evacuations.1 However, with police reports that 113 people had died inside their homes in the 27 
February 7 fires (AAP, 2009a) the colloquially termed ‘Stay or go’ policy came under 28 
scrutiny (AAP, 2009b). Questions were raised about the adequacy of warning systems; the 29 
preparedness and responses of residents and of fire and emergency services; and the 30 
effectiveness of the land use planning system that controls development in high-fire risk 31 
areas. These and other issues were investigated by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal 32 
Commission, which handed down 67 recommendations in its final report to the Victorian 33 
Government in July 2010 (Teague et al., 2010).  34 
 35 
This paper presents findings from research undertaken as part of the Bushfire Cooperative 36 
Research Centre’s (CRC) ‘2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Taskforce’. The Taskforce was 37 
established to provide the Royal Commission and Australian fire and emergency services 38 
with an independent analysis of the factors that contributed to the fires’ severity and impacts. 39 
Research covered three broad areas: fire behaviour; human behaviour and community safety; 40 
and building and planning issues. This paper presents findings from the human behaviour and 41 
community safety research, which investigated factors that influenced patterns of life and 42 
property loss/survival across the fire affected areas. The paper begins with an overview of the 43 
Australian approach to community bushfire safety, before discussing the research questions 44 
and methods that were used to conduct the research. Key findings are then presented and 45 
discussed. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the research for 46 
community bushfire safety – in particular, the applicability of the PSDLE approach. 47 
 48 
2. Community bushfire safety in Australia  49 
                                                 
1 We use the term ‘evacuation’ to refer to the act of leaving when bushfires threaten. In Victoria, authorities may 
advise residents to evacuate; however, responsibility for the decision and act of leaving lies with the resident. 
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In 2009, the Australian approach to community bushfire safety centred on the PSDLE policy. 50 
Under the policy, adopted by all Australian fire services, residents were advised to prepare to 51 
stay and defend their homes and properties from bushfires, or to prepare and leave well 52 
before a fire arrived in their area (AFAC, 2005a). The policy was underpinned by evidence, 53 
discussed below, that: (i) well-prepared houses can be successfully defended against 54 
bushfires and provide safe refuge during the main passage of the fire front; and (ii) that late 55 
evacuation is an inherently dangerous response to bushfires. Importantly, the policy 56 
recognised that fire and emergency services are unable to help everyone during a fire, 57 
whether through firefighting or assisted evacuation, and that residents must be prepared to 58 
respond without assistance. It also recognised that there are people who will want to stay with 59 
their homes and others who will want to leave. In effect, the policy simply formalised an 60 
approach to bushfire safety long adopted by Australians, while emphasising the dangers of 61 
late evacuation. 62 
 63 
A number of studies have documented the dangers associated with late evacuations (e.g. 64 
Wilson and Ferguson, 1984; Krusel and Petris, 1992; Handmer and Tibbits, 2005). Late 65 
evacuations are typically triggered by the appearance of flames and/or heavy smoke nearby. 66 
By this time it is likely that driving a vehicle will have become very difficult, with flames, 67 
smoke, strong winds, fallen trees, traffic and the urgency of the situation increasing the 68 
likelihood of accidents (Tibbits and Whittaker, 2007).  An analysis of recorded bushfire 69 
fatalities in Australia between 1900 and 2008 (Haynes et al., 2010) found that late evacuation 70 
was the most common activity at the time of death, accounting for around one-third (32%) of 71 
all fatalities. Another 11% was found to have been travelling through fire affected areas at the 72 
time of death.  For example, in the 2005 Eyre Peninsula bushfires in South Australia, eight of 73 
the nine fatalities occurred in or near cars after attempts to flee the fire (Deputy State 74 
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Coroner, 2005). Similar evidence has been compiled in the United States. Mutch (2007), for 75 
example, notes that many of the 22 residents who died in the 2003 southern Californian fires 76 
were attempting to flee.  77 
 78 
Research has shown that well-prepared houses can be successfully defended by occupants 79 
and provide safe refuge during the main passage of a fire front (e.g. Lazarus and Elley, 1984; 80 
Wilson and Ferguson, 1984, 1986; Ramsay et al., 1987; Cohen, 2000; Handmer and Tibbits, 81 
2005). Studies have found that embers – rather than direct flame contact or radiant heat – are 82 
the most common source of building ignition before, during and after the passage of a 83 
bushfire (Leonard and McArthur, 1999; Leonard, 2003). Consequently, some research has 84 
shown that residents can shelter inside well-prepared houses during the main fire front, going 85 
outside to extinguish small ignitions before and after. For example, a study of the 1983 Ash 86 
Wednesday fires in Victoria’s Otway Ranges found that residents ‘were able to save their 87 
houses by extinguishing small ignitions of the house itself before these fires became 88 
uncontrollable’ (Ramsay et al. 1987, p. 50). At Mt Macedon, also during the Ash Wednesday 89 
fires, Wilson and Ferguson (1984) recorded a 90% survival rate for houses that were actively 90 
defended by able-bodied occupants, compared to 82% for attended but not actively defended 91 
houses, and just 44% for unattended houses. Considering the risks associated with late 92 
evacuations, they concluded that: ‘provided they are adequately informed of the danger and 93 
risks involved, mature, able-bodied residents can minimise loss of life, and probably save 94 
their houses, by staying within the safety of their homes’ (Wilson and Ferguson 1984, p. 95 
235). Further evidence that people can and do protect their homes by staying to actively 96 
defend them has been compiled by Handmer and Tibbits (2005; see also Tibbits et al., 2008). 97 
 98 
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Alternatives to wildfire evacuation have also been debated in the United States. A 1995 issue 99 
of Wildfire magazine presented a number of perspectives on evacuation under the header 100 
‘Fight or flee?’ At issue was whether residents should have the option to stay and defend their 101 
homes from wildfire, which some U.S. citizens had done in the past, or whether the practice 102 
of mandatory evacuation should prevail. Queen (1995) argued that several of the fatalities in 103 
the 1991 Oakland firestorm could have been prevented if the victims had waited until the fire 104 
front had passed before leaving the area. He went on to note that: ‘What may work in 105 
Australia may not work in the U.S. However, evacuation is clearly not the only option. The 106 
decision to evacuate is a difficult one to make. The responsibility of making this decision 107 
rests with the occupants, not the firefighter’ (Queen, 1995, p. 23). In contrast, McMeekin 108 
(1995) outlined an approach to ‘population protection’ that, despite involving greater 109 
community engagement and planning, is largely focused on facilitating agency-led 110 
evacuations. Decker (1995) emphasised the needs for residents to ‘… create defensible space 111 
around their homes and to respond immediately to evacuation orders rather than waiting until 112 
the last moment’. More recently, the National Fire Protection Association published a feature 113 
article presenting arguments for and against the PSDLE approach in the USA (see Schorow, 114 
2011). 115 
 116 
The Australian approach has served as a reference point for debates over alternatives to 117 
evacuation in the United States. Scholars have generally agreed that ‘Prepare, stay and 118 
defend’ may be a viable alternative to evacuation in some situations, but that contextual 119 
differences – including the characteristics of wildfires and populations at risk – may mean 120 
that it is inadvisable in some locations (Paveglio et al., 2008; McCaffrey and Rhodes, 2009; 121 
Stephens et al., 2009). Another key difference is that, in Australia, the PSDLE approach 122 
arose from a tradition of rural self-reliance and household firefighting practices, rather than 123 
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policy. Significant institutional challenges have also been identified – such as redefining 124 
agency roles and responsibilities, educating and building the capacities of communities, and 125 
promoting ‘shared responsibility’ for wildfire risk – that would need to be overcome for the 126 
strategy to be successful (Paveglio et al., 2008; McCaffrey and Rhodes, 2009). Unlike in 127 
Australia, where it has been emphasised that staying requires active defence, passively 128 
‘sheltering-in-place’ has been considered an alternative to evacuation (Cova et al., 2010). In 129 
southern California, for example, Rancho Santa Fe has been actively promoted as a 130 
community that is designed to enable residents to ‘shelter-in-place’ during wildfires 131 
(Paveglio et al., 2008). 132 
 133 
Although the PSDLE policy had not undergone formal evaluation prior to the Black Saturday 134 
fires, fire services and many residents considered it a sound approach for reducing losses of 135 
life and property. Nevertheless, a number of studies had identified problems concerning its 136 
implementation. In a study of residents’ understandings of the policy, Rhodes (2005) found 137 
that while most people believed that ‘stay and defend’ was a viable strategy for protecting 138 
property, most did not see it as a strategy for protecting life. He argued that this is why most 139 
people prefer to ‘wait and see’ what a fire is like before they decide whether to stay or leave, 140 
which creates the potential for late evacuation. Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) found high 141 
levels of awareness and support for the policy following the 2003 Victorian bushfires, but 142 
identified two critical issues concerning its implementation. First, there was considerable 143 
confusion over the meaning of ‘leave early’, with many residents unsure of when to leave and 144 
unable to recognise when leaving was no longer a safe option. Second, many of those who 145 
had planned to stay and defend were not fully committed to doing so. They consciously or 146 
subconsciously retained late evacuation as an option despite recognising the dangers of this 147 
strategy. Research reported in this paper and elsewhere identifies ‘wait and see’ strategies as 148 
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a fundamental challenge for implementation of the policy (see Whittaker and Handmer, 149 
2010). 150 
 151 
3. Methods 152 
The Bushfire CRC established the ‘2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Taskforce’ to provide 153 
the Royal Commission and Australian fire and emergency services with an independent 154 
analysis of the factors that contributed to the fires’ severity and impacts. The scope of the 155 
Taskforce was determined by the Bushfire CRC, Country Fire Authority (CFA) and 156 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). The research covered three key areas: 157 
fire behaviour; human behaviour and community safety; and building and planning issues.  158 
 159 
The human behaviour and community safety research was designed with distinct qualitative 160 
and quantitative phases. The qualitative phase involved semi-structured, in-depth interviews 161 
with residents; the quantitative phase involved a mail survey of households within fire-162 
affected areas. A team of researchers began interviewing residents on 12 February, with more 163 
than 600 interviews conducted over a 12 week period (see Whittaker et al. 2009a). The mail 164 
survey comprised a range of questions concerning community safety issues, including 165 
awareness of bushfire risk prior to Black Saturday, the information and warnings people 166 
received, actions taken to plan and prepare, intended and actual responses to the fires, 167 
impacts of the fires on households, and basic demographic information (see Whittaker et al. 168 
2009b). Surveys were mailed to 6000 addresses in areas affected by the bushfires in October 169 
2009. Addresses that fell within the ‘burnt area’, as defined by DSE, were extracted from the 170 
Vicmap database (see State Government of Victoria, 2012). Residents were given three 171 
weeks to complete and return the survey. A response rate of 25% was obtained, with 1314 172 
surveys received from residents within each of the major fire complexes. Men and women 173 
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were more or less equally represented in the sample (53% women), with the majority of 174 
respondents (59%) aged between 35 and 54. Ethics approval was obtained from RMIT 175 
University’s Human Ethics Research Committee, with measures taken to ensure the safety 176 
and rights of participants and researchers. 177 
 178 
This paper focuses on the results of the mail survey. Results are presented for five key factors 179 
influencing community bushfire safety: pre-fire awareness of bushfire risk; planning and 180 
preparedness; intended responses; warnings; and actual responses to the fires.   181 
 182 
 183 
4. Research findings  184 
4.1 Pre-fire awareness of bushfire risk  185 
The survey results suggest high levels of bushfire awareness prior to the Black Saturday fires. 186 
It is important, however, to recognise that hindsight bias - where outcome information 187 
influences people’s recollections of their prior knowledge or beliefs (Bradfield and Wells, 188 
2005) – is likely to have influenced these results.   More than three-quarters (78%) of 189 
respondents reported they had previously thought it likely or very likely that a bushfire could 190 
occur in their town or suburb and more than two-thirds (67%) said they had perceived a high 191 
or very high level of threat. The proportion of respondents that thought it unlikely that a 192 
bushfire would occur in their town or suburb (22% overall) was considerably higher in the 193 
Horsham (72%) and Bendigo (53%) fires. Fires impacted on the suburban fringes of these 194 
regional cities, where many residents did not have past experience of bushfires and did not 195 
consider themselves at risk.  196 
 197 
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These high levels of reported hazard awareness did not necessarily translate into high levels 198 
of preparedness or protective action. As discussed below, many respondents were aware of 199 
the risk, yet did little to plan and prepare.  200 
 201 
4.2 Planning and preparedness  202 
More than two-thirds of respondents (69%) claimed to have had a ‘firm’ plan for what they 203 
would do in the event of a bushfire. Again, results suggest considerably lower levels of 204 
awareness and preparedness in Bendigo and Horsham, where around half (56% and 50%, 205 
respectively) of all respondents had not considered what to do in the event of a bushfire, or 206 
had decided they didn’t need to do anything. Of all respondents, most (78%) reported 207 
discussing their intended response with other members of their household and more than two-208 
thirds (68%) had planned for what each household member would do. Fewer respondents had 209 
considered how things could change if members of the household were not at home during 210 
the fire (42%) or had written down important things to do and remember (26%). 211 
 212 
Residents had taken a range of actions to physically prepare their homes and properties. The 213 
most common preparations were actions normally undertaken as part of general property 214 
maintenance, such as clearing leaves, grass and other debris from around the house (92%), 215 
clearing leaves from gutters (88%) and obtaining and preparing equipment such as ladders, 216 
buckets and mops (73%). Many residents had moved combustible materials such as firewood 217 
and garden furniture away from their homes (70%) and obtained and prepared firefighting 218 
equipment such as water pumps and hoses (66%). Less common were actions to protect 219 
vulnerable points on houses from ember attack, such as installing seals and draft protectors 220 
around windows and doors (35%), covering gaps and vents (31%), installing gutter protection 221 
(25%) and covering underfloor spaces (20%).  222 
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 223 
Survey results concerning planning and preparedness should be interpreted with caution. 224 
Respondents’ assessments of their preparedness are inevitably framed by their degree of 225 
knowledge about bushfires and of how to prepare, as well as their capacity to implement 226 
preparatory measures effectively. Almost half of the survey respondents (46%) rated their 227 
level of preparedness as high to very high, with the remainder assessing their preparedness as 228 
average (36%) or low to very low (17%). Despite this, almost three-quarters (72%) 229 
acknowledged that they could have been better prepared.  230 
 231 
4.3 Intended responses 232 
A broad range of factors influenced intended responses, including: age; physical capacity, 233 
mobility and health; responsibility for children, the elderly and others who require assistance; 234 
responsibility for pets and livestock; the location of property; perceptions of preparedness and 235 
capacities to defend; and the presence or absence of household members during the fire. 236 
Respondents were asked what, prior to February 7 2009, they had thought they would do if 237 
confronted by a bushfire. Half reported their intention to stay and defend throughout the fire 238 
(50%), while less than a fifth (19%) intended to leave before they came under threat (i.e. 239 
‘early’). Just 22 respondents (< 2%) had intended to leave their homes because it was a day of 240 
high fire danger (regardless of whether a fire had started). 241 
 242 
Analysis revealed a gender dimension to intended responses. A greater proportion of men 243 
(56%) intended to stay and defend throughout the fire than women (42%), who more often 244 
wanted to leave as soon as a fire was threatening than men (23% and 11%, respectively). A 245 
chi-square test confirmed that the association between these variables was statistically 246 
significant, X2 (7, N = 1134) = 50.25, p = < .0001. These findings are consistent with research 247 
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on gendered responses to bushfire, which has found that women are more likely to want to 248 
evacuate when confronted by bushfire (see Eriksen et al., 2010). 249 
 250 
Significantly, more than one-quarter of survey respondents (26%) were effectively 251 
undecided, intending to stay and defend but leave if they felt threatened (17%) or to wait and 252 
see what the fire was like before deciding to stay or leave (9%). Those who were not fully 253 
committed to leaving early or staying to defend were effectively adopting a ‘wait-and-see’ 254 
strategy. ‘Wait-and-see’ strategies greatly increase the risk of late and dangerous evacuations. 255 
As noted above, the opportunity for safe evacuation is likely to have passed once a fire has 256 
reached or is in close vicinity of a person’s home or property. 257 
 258 
4.4 Warnings  259 
Warnings played a pivotal role in household responses to the fires. As noted above, the 260 
extreme fire weather experienced on February 7 had been accurately forecast, and authorities 261 
had warned of the potential for the worst fire danger in Victoria’s history. Indeed, 99% of 262 
survey respondents claimed to have known that February 7 was a day of Total Fire Ban. 263 
However, interviews revealed that these warnings did not necessarily lead to greater alertness 264 
or pre-emptive action (see Whittaker et al. 2009a). 265 
 266 
While the majority of respondents (62%) did not receive an ‘official’ warning from police, 267 
fire or emergency services, many (63%) received an ‘unofficial’ warning from family, friends 268 
or neighbours. Environmental cues such as seeing flames and smoke were also important in 269 
alerting people to the fires. However, the extreme heat on February 7 appears to have reduced 270 
people’s receptiveness to warnings and environmental cues, with many taking shelter from 271 
the heat inside their darkened, air-conditioned homes. 272 
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 273 
4.5 Actual responses 274 
The majority of respondents (53%) stayed to defend their homes and properties from the 275 
fires. Of these, around one-third left during the fire because of perceived danger, failure of 276 
equipment or utilities, or because the house caught fire. 43% of respondents left their homes 277 
or properties either before or when the fires arrived in their area. A small proportion (4%) 278 
reported that they sheltered inside a house, in a structure other than a house, in a vehicle, or 279 
somewhere outside. 280 
 281 
Those who left 282 
A greater proportion of women (54%) left their homes and properties before or during the 283 
fires than men (35%). Just over half of these respondents (54%) considered themselves to 284 
have left late or very late, with 16% leaving within 20 minutes of the fire arriving and one 285 
quarter (25%) leaving once the fire had arrived. The vast majority (80%) perceived the level 286 
of danger to be high or very high when they left, with many experiencing difficulties 287 
associated with smoke (55%), poor visibility (35%), traffic (30%), embers (29%), flames 288 
(26%) and fallen trees (16%).  289 
 290 
The vast majority of those who undertook late evacuations arrived at their destination 291 
unharmed. Consequently, most indicated they would take the same action if there was a 292 
similar fire in the future (74%). They often explained that life is more important than 293 
property, and that staying to defend is not worth the risk. Importantly, however, most did 294 
express an intention to leave earlier. Those who said they would stay and defend against 295 
future fires often explained that their circumstances had changed (e.g. no longer responsible 296 
for children or the elderly) or that they were now better prepared and able to defend.  297 
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Those who stayed  299 
Reflecting the data on intended responses, a greater proportion of men (62%) stayed and 300 
defended than women (42%). Most stayed to protect assets from the fires (83%); however, 301 
some stayed because they felt it was too late to leave (9%) or because their attempts to leave 302 
were unsuccessful (3%). Those who stayed because it was too late to leave, or because they 303 
were unable to leave, suffered double the rate of house destruction (31%) than those who 304 
stayed because they wanted to protect their house and other assets (16%), highlighting the 305 
importance of prior planning and preparedness. Nevertheless, most had felt confident they 306 
could do what was required to protect themselves and others (78%) and their house and 307 
property (69%).  308 
 309 
Many of those who stayed to defend received help from members of their household (50%), 310 
family, friends and neighbours (48%) and/or fire and emergency services (13%). Such help 311 
appears to have influenced patterns of property loss, with higher rates of house destruction 312 
among those who did not receive help (3 in 10 destroyed) than those who were helped by 313 
household members (1 in 10), family, friends and neighbours (1 in 10) and fire and 314 
emergency services (3 in 100).  315 
 316 
One-third (38%) of those who stayed to defend left at some stage while their property was 317 
under threat. The most commonly cited reason for leaving a house or property was that it was 318 
too dangerous to stay and defend (44%). Other reasons were that there were flames in the 319 
immediate vicinity of the property (33%) and to remove other household members or visitors 320 
from danger (26%). One-quarter left because utilities or equipment failed (26%) and/or 321 
because their house caught fire (18%). Many of these residents reported encountering the 322 
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same dangers as those who evacuated late, such as smoke (74%), embers (59%), poor 323 
visibility (56%), flames (56%) and fallen trees (37%).  324 
 325 
The majority of respondents who stayed with their home or property indicated that they 326 
would take the same action if there was a similar fire in the future (76%). This is reflective of 327 
the success of the PSDLE approach for most people during the February 7 fires, and the fact 328 
that many now feel better prepared and more capable of defending against bushfire. Those 329 
who said they would leave in the future tended to have negative experiences of staying, and 330 
were not willing to risk their or others’ lives to protect property. 331 
 332 
Relationship between intentions and actions 333 
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Figure 2: Action taken, by intention2
                                                 
2 Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
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Figure 2 charts intended responses against actual responses to the February 7 fires. The majority 1 
of those who intended to stay and defend throughout the fire did so (72%). Importantly, the 2 
majority of those who intended to stay and defend but leave if threatened ended up leaving 3 
(79%). Similarly, most of those who intended to see what the fire was like, or wait for advice 4 
from emergency services, left once the fire had arrived (63% and 52%, respectively). Those who 5 
intended to leave as soon as they became aware of a fire most often left, either before or when 6 
the fire arrived (48% and 43%, respectively). It is significant that the majority of those who 7 
intended to leave on all high fire danger days (n=22), regardless of whether there was a fire, left 8 
before the fire arrived (91%).  9 
 10 
Relationship between household response and house damage 11 
One-third (33%) of survey respondents reported that their house was destroyed in the fires, 12 
with the highest rates of destruction (the percentage of houses lost in each area) in the 13 
Murrindindi (47%), Churchill (39%) and Kilmore East (33%) fires. 14 
15 
 20 
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 17 
Figure 3: House damage, by household action3 18 
 19 
Rates of house damage and destruction were considerably lower among households where 20 
residents stayed and defended (Figure 3). In households where at least one person stayed and 21 
defended, just two in ten houses were destroyed. In households where all householders left, 22 
or sheltered without defending, five in ten houses were destroyed. A chi-square test 23 
confirmed that the association between these variables was statistically significant, X2 (3, N = 24 
1264) = 167.01, p = < .0001. 25 
 26 
5. Discussion and conclusions 27 
The findings in this paper largely reinforce past bushfire research, while providing new 28 
insights into a range of community safety issues. Arguably the most important debate 29 
following the Black Saturday fires concerned the appropriateness of the PSDLE policy and 30 
its implementation by authorities and residents. The fact that 113 of the 173 fatalities 31 
                                                 
3 ‘Stay and defend’ includes households where at least one person stayed and defended, while ‘Leave / shelter’ 
includes households where all members left and/or sheltered without defending.  
 21 
occurred inside houses meant that the policy and its evidence base were scrutinised. Critics 32 
argued that the policy, as implemented, had contributed to fatalities by encouraging people to 33 
stay and defend homes that were not defendable under such extreme conditions. However, 34 
critics typically assumed that those who died had been defending at the time of death. 35 
Subsequent analysis of the fatalities found that more than two-thirds (69%) had been 36 
sheltering passively when they perished (Handmer et al. 2010). While some of these people 37 
may have attempted to defend before taking shelter, ‘… few fatalities were found near 38 
evidence of the means of firefighting… and positions of bodies, such as bodies found in a 39 
lying position, or in the bath, suggest passive sheltering rather than active defence’ (Handmer 40 
et al. 2010, p. 25). More broadly, the analysis revealed a lack of fire risk awareness among 41 
those who died, and a limited degree of planning and preparedness (Handmer et al. 2010). 42 
 43 
Results presented in this paper suggest varied levels of awareness, planning and preparedness 44 
among those affected by the fires. As has already been noted, these results must be 45 
interpreted cautiously due to the possible effects of hindsight bias (Bradfield and Wells, 46 
2005) and highly varied perceptions of what constitutes adequate planning and preparedness. 47 
Most respondents claimed they had previously thought it likely that a bushfire would occur 48 
where they lived (78%) and rated the threat as high or very high (67%). Lower levels of 49 
bushfire awareness were recorded in more suburban locations (e.g. in or on the outskirts of 50 
towns or regional cities) where many residents did not have prior experience or knowledge of 51 
bushfire and had not considered themselves at risk. These results probably exaggerate 52 
awareness levels prior to Black Saturday and certainly say little about people’s 53 
understandings of bushfire risk. In any case, research has shown that awareness of risk does 54 
not necessarily spur planning and preparedness (Berringer, 1998; McGee and Russell, 2003; 55 
Eriksen and Gill, 2010; Prior, 2010).  56 
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 57 
Findings related to planning and preparedness are similar to those for awareness, with most 58 
respondents assessing their preparedness level as ‘high’ to ‘very high’ (46%) or ‘average’ 59 
(36%). Clearly, these findings obscure considerable variation in the quality of people’s plans 60 
and preparation, which was apparent in the qualitative component of the research (see 61 
Whittaker et al., 2009a). As has been found in other studies (e.g. Bushnell et al., 2007; 62 
Rhodes 2007), the most common preparations undertaken by residents were low-cost and 63 
‘easy to do’ actions such as clearing leaves and grass from around the house and obtaining 64 
equipment such as ladders, buckets and mops. These actions are often part of general 65 
property maintenance and may not be undertaken with the intent of preparing for bushfire. It 66 
is significant that almost three-quarters of the survey respondents thought they could have 67 
been better prepared. 68 
 69 
Media coverage and public debate after the fires understandably focused on the many deaths 70 
and property losses. Less prominent were the stories of people who stayed and successfully 71 
defended their homes and properties. The research reported in this paper revealed a survival 72 
rate of 77% for houses that were defended by one or more household members, and 44% for 73 
houses that were unattended.4 These results are comparable to the house survival rates 74 
recorded by Wilson and Ferguson (1984) in the Ash Wednesday fires at Mt Macedon (90% 75 
for houses that were actively defended; 82% for attended but not actively defended houses; 76 
and 44% for unattended houses). There are, of course, many other factors that influence 77 
house survival in bushfires. Research has identified links between house loss and weather 78 
conditions (e.g., Bradstock and Gill, 2001; Blanchi et al., 2010), fire severity (Wilson and 79 
Ferguson, 1986), distance to bushland (Crompton et al., 2010) and the design and 80 
                                                 
4 These figures exclude the small proportion of houses that sustained major damage (4% of defended and 2% of 
unattended houses). 
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construction of buildings (e.g. McArthur and Lutton, 1991; Blanchi and Leonard, 2008). 81 
While in-depth investigation of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper, resident 82 
planning and preparation was investigated as a means for reducing risks to property. Results 83 
indicate a higher rate of house survival among households where there was a firm, pre-84 
existing intention to stay and defend. Houses were also more likely to survive when defended 85 
by more than one person. The fact that 77% of those who stayed to defend were able to 86 
protect their house from the fires reinforces that ‘stay and defend’ is a viable alternative to 87 
evacuation when residents have undertaken appropriate planning and preparation, and are 88 
assisted by others. 89 
 90 
Clearly, however, the results of this study highlight a number of problems and challenges for 91 
the PSDLE approach and for community bushfire safety more broadly. Although late 92 
evacuation is an inherently dangerous response to bushfires (Wilson and Ferguson, 1984; 93 
Krusel and Petris, 1992; Handmer and Tibbits, 2005; Haynes et al., 2010), it was an effective 94 
response for the majority of those who did so in the Black Saturday fires. Most of those who 95 
undertook late evacuation arrived at their destination unharmed, despite 80% perceiving the 96 
danger to be high or very high when they left and more than half encountering dangers 97 
associated with flames, embers, smoke and fallen trees. Importantly, however, 24 (14%) of 98 
those who perished in the fires were fleeing on foot or by car (Handmer et al., 2010), 99 
highlighting that late evacuation remains a dangerous response to bushfire.  100 
 101 
The viability of the PSDLE policy was a key issue for the Royal Commission. It 102 
acknowledged that ‘… the central tenets of the stay or go policy remain sound’ but concluded 103 
that the February 7 fires had exposed weaknesses in the way it was applied’ (Teague et al., 104 
2010, p. 5). The Commission found that the policy did not account for ‘ferocious’ fires, and 105 
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recommended greater emphasis on the increased risks to life and property ‘on the worst days’ 106 
and on leaving early as the safest option. These are now key messages in the national 107 
‘Prepare. Act. Survive.’ strategy (AFAC, 2009). To better communicate the risks to life and 108 
property on the days of highest fire danger, the Commission also recommended that Fire 109 
Danger Ratings be revised to include a rating beyond ‘Extreme’. This led to the development 110 
of the ‘National Framework for Scaled Advice and Warnings to the Community (AEMC, 111 
2009) and the introduction of the ‘Catastrophic/Code Red’ rating. In Victoria, the CFA has 112 
developed ‘scaled advice’ to more clearly communicate what residents can expect and what 113 
they should do for different levels of fire danger (CFA, 2012). Residents are advised that 114 
homes are not designed or constructed to withstand fires burning under ‘Catastrophic’ 115 
conditions, and that leaving high bushfire risk areas the night before or early in the day is the 116 
safest option.  117 
 118 
The tendency for people to wait until a fire arrives before deciding whether to stay and 119 
defend or leave is a perennial challenge for fire services (Rhodes, 2005; Whittaker and 120 
Handmer, 2010; Teague et al., 2010). This study found that around a quarter of respondents 121 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ strategy in the Black Saturday fires, a strategy that greatly increases 122 
the likelihood that people will undertake late and dangerous evacuations or become trapped 123 
in a shelter that cannot be defended. Importantly, the Royal Commission recognised that the 124 
binary approach of ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ does not adequately reflect the 125 
reality of what people do during bushfires: ‘… the reality [is] that people will continue to 126 
wait and see, and a comprehensive bushfire policy must accommodate this by providing for 127 
more options and different advice’ (Teague et al. 2010, p. 5). In response, the CFA and 128 
Victorian local governments have designated ‘Neighbourhood Safer Places’ as places of last 129 
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resort, while the Australian Building Codes Board is developing standards for the design and 130 
construction of bushfire bunkers for personal use.  131 
 132 
Many of the changes initiated by the Royal Commission have the potential to increase 133 
community bushfire safety. However, they are no panacea. As this and other research has 134 
shown, having an intention to leave early does not necessarily mean that people will do so. 135 
Confusion over the meaning of ‘leave early’ and difficulty recognising when it is too late to 136 
leave (Tibbits and Whittaker, 2007) means that many of those who intend to leave early 137 
undertake late evacuations. ‘Code Red’ warnings were introduced to alert residents to the 138 
potential for catastrophic bushfires and to encourage them to leave early. However, research 139 
following a Code Red declaration a year after Black Saturday found that very few residents 140 
actually left their homes in the absence of a fire (see Whittaker and Handmer, 2010). The 141 
frequency of high fire danger days in summer, and the relative infrequency of bushfires, 142 
means that leaving when there is no fire is impractical for most residents (Tibbits and 143 
Whittaker, 2007; Johnson et al., 2012). The introduction of community refuges and personal 144 
bunkers may have expanded the range of options available to residents in high bushfire risk 145 
areas; however, the possibility of last minute evacuation to a nearby place of refuge may 146 
serve to discourage appropriate planning and preparation.  147 
 148 
The results presented in this paper indicate that staying to defend or leaving when threatened, 149 
while not without their risks, were effective responses for most people in the Black Saturday 150 
fires. Nevertheless, 173 people did lose their lives, including many inside houses. The results 151 
of this study highlight that people who are inadequately prepared and who take action at the 152 
last moment are more likely to be forced into dangerous responses such as late evacuation, 153 
untenable defence and passive shelter.  154 
155 
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